Publisher description
This paper examines the causes and effects of dissonance between the British strategic command and the British Middle East Command during the summer of 1941. Relying on historical research, this paper finds that multiple conflicts spread across an immense geographic area complicated the operational response and contributed to the strategic misunderstanding of the operational challenges. Further, the strategic interjections into the operational sphere, choosing tactical operations against the advice of the military commander, resulted in failure to win the most important campaign. The victorious campaigns, undertaken against the advice of the military commander, proved to have no strategic value, and may have ultimately cost the British forces far more than any possible benefit they could provide
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Strategic Dissonance: British Middle East Command in World War II
Book reviews » Strategic Dissonance: British Middle East Command in World War II
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